With Lady Frere's compliments

Pam - Africa - South Bechuanaland

LIBRARY

MEMORANDA AND LETTERS

ON

BECHUANALAND,

WRITTEN AT VARIOUS TIMES BY

THE RIGHT HON. SIR BARTLE FRERE.

Printed for Private Circulation only.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BLOEMHOF AND CHRISTIANA DISTRICTS, AND KEATE AWARD, TRANSVAAL AND GRIQUALAND WEST.

(*Written in September*, 1879.)

THE following remarks relate to the territory between the Vaal and the Hart Rivers, west of the Makwasi Spruit, and north of Griqualand West boundary. The greater part of the territory is known as the "Keate Award," or Christiana District of the Transvaal.

When I visited Pretoria my attention was particularly directed by Mr. Justice Kotze to the legal question of jurisdiction over that territory.

The position of this question will be best understood by a brief sketch of the history of the territory. Little certain is known about it till less than fifty years ago. Previous to that time it is said to have had no inhabitants, save a few wandering Bushmen. When Moselikatze destroyed or absorbed the tribes in the northern side of the Vaal Basin, many Korannas and other broken clans fled to this district, but kept chiefly to good hiding-ground on the river borders, and appear to have seldom shown themselves on the open country between the rivers which was one of Moselikatze's chief hunting-grounds up to the time about 1836-7, when Captain (afterwards Sir William) Harris, visited him north of the Vaal.

When the Voortrekker Boers came, they appear to have found few fixed inhabitants, and the country being good for sheep and cattle, many of the Boers settled there, and seem to have made the first titles to their lands by occupation, and building farmhouses. Title-deeds were subsequently given out in the usual rough manner, after the Boer republics were established, and a Landdrost was appointed first at Bloemhof, but the office was subsequently transferred to Christiana, so named after the daughter of Mr. Pretorius, the then President.

As the country became settled, population increased, and the land became valuable, disputes arose between the Boers and native headmen; the cause of the former was taken up by the

Transvaal Republic, that of the latter by the Government of Griqualand West.

Commissioners were appointed by each Government to define the boundary between the Transvaal in this direction and the independent native tribes. Each Commissioner reported in favour of the view taken by his own Government. The question was by consent referred for arbitration to Mr. Keate, then Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, who decided in favour of the line traced by the English Commissioner, and so gave all the territory to the native tribes.

Mr. Keate's decision is a simple verdict, giving no reasons, and delivered in Natal, 400 miles from the district, of which he knew nothing personally, and whence he could have had no evidence but what the two Commissioners laid before him. It is not therefore the sort of decision which could be expected to terminate disputes in a district where there could be no naturally valid legal or diplomatic title, save occupation and use for about half a generation, succeeding ages of unmitigated law of the strongest. It attempted no adjustment of conflicting private claims. It simply determined national sovereignty, and as such it was sufficient, and legally binding on the Transvaal Government.

But it did not satisfy the Transvaal people, who were interested in the territory being assigned to the Transvaal, and they had sufficient influence in the Transvaal Volksraad to overbear and defy the authority of the President Mr. M. Pretorius, and to repudiate his acts. This led, I believe, not remotely, to his resignation. Had the state of the Transvaal not been at the time so unsettled, the consequences as between the British Government and the Transvaal Republic might have been much more serious. As it was, the Transvaal functionaries were never withdrawn from the territory, and they are there still,* exercising the only visible ruling authority under orders from the Transvaal Government.

Colonel Lanyon and Mr. Justice Kotze represented to me that it was absolutely necessary for the due administration of justice in the Keate Award to have legal authority for any exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Transvaal.

There can be no legal doubt of the right of the British Government to legislate for the district, whether as protector of the native tribes (the capacity in which the Keate Award was made, and would have been enforced by the Griqualand West Government, had the Transvaal Republic continued to exist), or as successor to, and representative of, the late Republic

* September, 1879.

(the other claimant of the territory). The right of the British Crown to legislate seems unquestionable.

But Mr. Justice Kotze represented that the authority of his Court, however valid within the boundaries of Transvaal proper, is liable to be questioned in the Christiana district, or anywhere outside the limits fixed for the Transvaal by the Keate Award. He expressed himself as quite satisfied if jurisdiction were given to his Court by a proclamation of the High Commissioner declaring the district to be annexed to, and to be a part of, the Transvaal.

Before issuing such a proclamation, however, Mr. Justice Kotze and Colonel Lanyon agreed with me that we should hear what could be said on the other side by those interested in the enforcement of the Keate Award, viz. the Government of Griqualand West, representing the British Government as protectors of the native tribes, Korannas and others, who dispute the ownership of the land with the Transvaal Boers.

We therefore decided to suspend action till Colonel Lanyon and I had traversed the district on our way to Kimberley, till we had met Colonel Warren, the present acting Administrator, and seen and heard on the spot the parties on both sides. The complete execution of this plan was interrupted by Colonel Lanyon being obliged to turn back from Potchefstroom, in order to meet Lord Chelmsford at Utrecht. But in company with Colonel Warren I saw most of the leading men interested, natives as well as Europeans, and had ample opportunity of forming a better opinion than could be formed from the mere perusal of documents on record

Colonel Warren had, previous to his appointment to act for Colonel Lanyon as Administrator at Kimberley, been charged to inquire and report on the land question in the Keate Award in the same manner as he had done in Griqualand West, with a view to a settlement of individual titles to the land. His appointment as Administrator had interrupted this work, but he had made a good commencement, and I saw at Christiana his assistant, Mr. Eaton, and examined his records sufficiently to satisfy myself that the necessary preliminary inquiries were proceeding in a very thorough manner.

Had Colonel Warren been able to finish this work the result would have afforded an ample basis for deciding as to the future management of this territory. On his satisfying me that it is impossible for him to continue the work in conjunction with his current duties as Administrator of Griqualand West, I applied to the Commander of the Forces for the services of Major Moysey, R.E., and have reason to hope we may obtain them.

All progress in this direction has been for the time suspended in consequence of the change made in the government of the Transvaal by Sir Garnet Wolseley's appointment. In the hope that his Excellency will soon be able to give his attention to the subject, and that I may aid him in disposing of it satisfactorily, I have given the above details more at length than might otherwise be necessary, and I will now describe the manner in which I intended to deal with the question, had it been left in my hands. Nothing, I think, can be finally decided as to property in the land, or jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts, till such an inquiry and settlement as Colonel Warren made in Griqualand West has been made, reported to and confirmed by Her Majesty's Government. This, therefore, should be pressed on as quickly as is consistent with accuracy and completeness. In the meantime we must make the best temporary arrangements we can.

The most pressing question is the criminal jurisdiction. If a murder is committed, where shall it be tried? and by what court?

This question has already been raised, and may be again raised any day.

The question where shall civil suits be decided is hardly less pressing.

But until some settlement can be made which shall give a sort of "Parliamentary title" to land, questions regarding land cannot be safely left to a Civil Court, guided by the ordinary rules of regular tribunals under either English or Dutch-Roman law.

The materials for the decision of such a court cannot exist where there were hardly any human beings save wandering Bushmen within living memory, and where history goes no further back than the memory of the oldest inhabitant.

As regards the wishes of the present inhabitants, I received urgent and well-drawn-up memorials, as well as verbal representations innumerable, from both European and native inhabitants, some representing that, by right and usage, as well as by inclination, they belong to the Transvaal, and begging that they might be allowed so to remain; others that on similar grounds the Keate Award should be carried out, and that they should be placed under Griqualand West. I soon found that personal predilection for this or that official was generally at the bottom of the wishes thus expressed.

The native requests generally pointed to Griqualand West as the government most likely to do them justice, and to which therefore they desired to be annexed.

Probably, if assured that equal justice would be done them

by either government, and no favour shown to white or black, the inclination of the people would point to whichever of the two markets, Kimberley or Potchefstroom, was the more convenient for them, and the district would be divided by a north and south line somewhere near Bloemhof, the east portion going to the Transvaal, the west to Griqualand West.

To ascertain the wishes of the people in this respect by open discussion and direct voting would not be possible with any useful result till the questions affecting land titles have been finally decided.

It must not then be forgotten how strong a feeling exists among the Transvaal Boers that, as the integrity of the Transvaal was promised to them in the Annexation Proclamation, the transfer of any portion of the district of Griqualand West would be a violation of such promise.

This view was very strongly stated to me by a leading member of the Boer's Committee, who said, half in joke, but with some emphasis, "if you make over a single farm in the Christiana District to Griqualand West we shall all be ready to shoot." He did not, however, meet the argument that if the Keate Award was to be upheld, the district formed no legal part of the Transvaal Territory, nor my assurance that many Boers to the southward had begged to be transferred to Kimberley on the ground that, now all were under the same British Government, Kimberley was a more convenient centre for them than either Pretoria or Potchefstroom. I proposed to meet all present difficulties by the following arrangements.

That a Proclamation be issued by both Governments, Transvaal and Griqualand West, and confirmed on all requisite points by an Order of Her Majesty in Council to the following effect:—

That the territory, which was the subject of the Keate Award, and all included between the Vaal and Hart Rivers to the south-east and north-west, the Griqualand West boundary to the south-west, and the Makwasi Spruit to the north-east, is and remains British territory, and all the inhabitants are under British protection.

That the affairs of the territory shall be administered by a Special Commission of British officers under Her Majesty's authority, as represented by the High Commissioner (the Governor of the Transvaal or of the Cape Colony, as may be determined).

That Major Moysey, R.E., be appointed to take charge of the duties lately entrusted to Colonel Warren, R.E., C.M.G., as Settlement Officer, to inquire and report on the possession and title to lands in the said territory as Special Commissioner

for land settlements under the Government of Griqualand West.

That whilst so employed he is vested with the powers of a Civil Commissioner, and Resident Magistrate and Justice of the Peace in Griqualand West, of a Field Commandant, and a Landdrost in the Transvaal (for all which offices separate warrants should be given him from both Administrations), and is placed in charge of all police and magisterial duties within the said territory of the Keate Award. The Landdrost of Christiana, Field-Cornets, and all other Government officials in the said territory being subject to his authority, and acting under his orders in the same manner as if he were Administrator of the province to which the territory was annexed.

That in case of any offender being brought before him and charged with any offence requiring in his judgment a heavier punishment than he as magistrate was authorized to inflict, he should be empowered to commit the prisoner for trial before either the Transvaal or Griqualand West High Court, as might be most convenient for witnesses, &c., and that those Courts should be authorized to deal with the case as if it had occurred within the boundaries of their own colony or territory.

That all moneys paid to the State under existing laws in the Transvaal should be received till further orders of Her Majesty's Government, on account of the Transvaal, and after defraying the current charges of the district, including the expenses of the Settlement Commissioner's salary, the balance should be accounted for to the Transvaal Government, on whose treasury the Settlement Commissioner should draw for any sum required to make up his own salary and the expenses of his office. That the district shall continue to be administered as a part of the Transvaal till the Settlement has been completed; and that on its completion the Settlement Officer should report on the arrangements which, with reference to the convenience of the inhabitants and other circumstances, he thinks best for the permanent administration of the district, (I may here note that hereafter it may be found advisable to combine the management of this territory of the Keate Award with that of the territory west of the Hart River, which is the subject of a separate correspondence, but it is well for the present, to keep the two questions distinct, since, in the case of the Keate Award, there is no question of sovereignty, nor of the responsibility of the British Government for deciding the other questions as to how and by whom the British Government shall be represented in the administration of the territory, and to whom the individual rights in the land shall belong).

The following is the scale of salaries which, after consultation with Colonel Warren, I think should be allowed to the Special Settlement Commissioner and his establishment.

Special Commissioner, the same as drawn by Colonel Warren as Settlement Officer in Griqualand West. Secretary, £450, and ordinary Civil Service allowance when travelling.

Clerk, 12*s.* per diem; messenger, 5*s.* per diem; servant, 5*s.* per diem; translators and interpreters when required, say, £60 per mensem. Colonel Warren estimated that at these rates the cost of inspection and settlement of the district would not exceed about £1000, with perhaps £100 additional for office expenses, printing, &c.

But whatever the costs of settlement, they may, and I think they should, be assessed on the properties settled, and paid for either by a lump sum on each farm or holding, or by a small addition to the quitrent. The advantages of settlement will be so great that there will be no difficulty as to the payment of a far larger sum than the settlement is likely to cost.

The Commissioner's proceedings would be much facilitated if a few good men of the sappers, accustomed to survey work, could be attached to him for a few months.

In the Keate Award, as elsewhere throughout these parts, the Government official is met by claims founded on grants by former Governments or chiefs, often enormous in extent and preposterous in terms, but formal enough in the written grants on which the grantee relies. These claims involve political questions of great importance, which cannot be investigated or decided except on the spot. They arise from the fact that as soon as land began to become valuable, and some sort of government to be established in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, there was, in this thinly-inhabited border territory of the Keate Award, no lack of claimants, to represent whichever of the adjoining powers might be most convenient. I have been assured by a respected member of the Griqualand West Legislature that when he first went to the Diamond Fields, soon after their discovery, it was a common amusement of the diggers and their friends, when they met for their weekly holiday on the banks of the Vaal, to invent and discuss, in a sort of extempore congress or parliament, not only local rules and ordinances for the better regulation of the diggings, but projects of constitutions and treaty cessions, which were debated with much formality by self-constituted representatives of the surrounding powers, such as the republics of Rustemberg, Pretoria, or Potchefstroom of the Orange Free State, of various Koranna, Griqua, Batlapin and Bechuana chiefs, and even of the British Government.

At one of these meetings a serious proposition was made by a Transvaal visitor, to annex the country to the Transvaal, and he produced from a newspaper parcel a Transvaal flag, which he proposed to hoist and salute; but a majority of the delegates present being of a different opinion, he and his flag were tied to a ferryman's rope and towed through the river. The Union Jack was then hoisted; but the British representative declined the office of president of the new territory, on the ground that he could not swim, and he might be drowned if the Opposition repeated on him the operation of hauling him through the river, whereupon he was, with all due formality, promised protection and support by brethren diggers, one of whom produced a formal commission as commander-in-chief of the army of a Koranna chief, supported by another who was commissioned with equal formality as commander of the chief's artillery.

Probably this sort of semi-jocular travesty of the proceedings of regular and old-settled Governments might find parallel in the history of all young communities of settlers, under similar conditions. But I mention it here partly because it illustrates the injustice of much of the criticism on the proceedings of my predecessors, and of the English Government at that time stepping in to secure order and regular government where no security for either previously existed; partly also as an instance of what has gone on, and is now going on, and must continue to go on, wherever the irregular advanced guard of civilization, in the shape of traders, travellers or diggers, or even of missionary enterprise, comes in contact with such native government as depends mainly on personal power and influence. But I mention the state of things at that time, more especially as accounting for the present existence of numerous claims to large extents of ground, which involve political questions, more or less, of national right, and must be disposed of before any settlement of individual farms or holdings can be attempted.

Amongst these claims enumerated to me by Colonel Warren are the following:—

(*a.*) A claim of Mr. David Arnot to about 840 square miles of land.
(*b.*) A claim by the Lynx Korannas to the whole of the Bloemhof District.
(*c.*) A similar claim to the whole district by the Chief Mankoroane.
(*d.*) A claim of Botlasitsi tribe to a large district.
(*e.*) A similar claim of the Taaibosch Korannas.
(*f.*) Besides claims of certain grantees from the Transvaal

Government, claiming for public services said to have been rendered, large tracts of country, including many farms beyond the usual limit of 6000 acres.

All these several classes of claims must be decided on, before even a commencement can be made in settlement, either of individual farms or of tribal locations. Each claim probably can find some sort of proof in ample documentary evidence, drawn up in the usual legal form, supported by trained law agents and advocates, who have no lack of professional ability, though their professional antecedents do not always entitle them to practice in the Courts of the Colony.

The claims, in fact, are of a kind which, on paper and at a distance, may appear fair enough, but will not bear the test of open local inquiry in the face of men resident in the country and knowing its history. Some of them, especially the native claims, may have a substratum of justice, and be merely extravagant in extent, admitting of reasonable compromise; others must be investigated and disposed of whilst living evidence is at hand to prove or disprove them. But all must be investigated, and finally decided, before there can be either peace or justice and recognised legal rights in the country.

Meantime, it must not be supposed that the country is a wilderness. It is an undulating prairie of fine pasture lands, with numerous herds of cattle and flocks of sheep, bales of whose wool, piled at the trader's stores, or on waggons along the road, prove its importance as an article of export. Such cultivation as exists from dams or water furrows shows the great fertility of the soil, and the Vaal River along the whole length of the district offers infinite capacity for irrigation. A mail waggon twice in the week carries passengers to Kimberley or Potchefstroom.

Hotels and accommodation houses of the usual colonial type are to be found at each stage. The traders' stores and farmhouses are often large and substantial, and many of the farmers and traders are men of wealth as well as enterprise. But there is nothing certain about either law or jurisdiction. The landholder holds as much by the strong hand as by legal tenure, and the stronger his hand the larger his possessions, and the firmer his hold on them.

No man can tell with any certainty to what province or jurisdiction he belongs, or whether he holds legally under the Chief Botlasitsi or Mankoroane, under grant from the Transvaal Republic or from Her Majesty Queen Victoria; whether

he is subject to English or Roman-Dutch law, or to the "Raad" of Councillors of some half or whole-caste Batlapin, Griqua, or Koranna chieftain, who may be either an educated man with a respectable trader or missionary as his adviser, or he may be the besotted victim of some outlawed law agent or trader. We had an instance of the consequences of this state of doubt when Colonel Warren came to meet us as we entered the district. A meeting of Boers was held, at which I was told it was generally debated in what capacity Colonel Warren came, and how he should be received. As Administrator of Griqualand West, some said he had no business in the Transvaal territory; he came probably to advocate the claims of the native chiefs to have the Keate Award carried into execution. On the other hand it was agreed that he was favourably known as a military leader against rebel Griquas and Korannas, and some of the men present had served as volunteers under him in the late operations beyond the Griqualand Border.

Finally, a leading malcontent of much local influence under the Transvaal Government reminded them that they must either make common cause with their brethren in the Transvaal, put the Administrator over the border, and perhaps shoot him; or they must receive him with proper respect, and fire a *feu de joie* in his honour. No one volunteered to undertake the former task; it was unanimously resolved to adopt the latter, and the gentleman who had proposed the alternative, himself led the procession to welcome the Administrator, and escort him to meet me.

It was also in this district that a landdrost and a considerable landed proprietor found it necessary to explain to me the groundlessness of a charge that he had been active in pulling down and forbidding the display of the Union Jack. It will be seen from these instances that the doubts as to jurisdiction are not confined to the Administrator of the Transvaal, or the Chief Justice, and that they are founded on something more than legal subtleties, and cannot too soon be set at rest.

As regard the mode of proceeding to be followed in the inquiry and settlement, I do not think any better can be prescribed than that adopted by Colonel Warren in his settlements in Griqualand West. After all the documentary evidence had been recorded and classified, any oral evidence tendered was taken verbally in open court or on oath, the Commissioner making an official note of the testimony given. Affidavits were admitted of parties at a distance; claimants were allowed to employ advocates, attorneys or agents, to state their case if they desired it. Each claim as decided was

plotted on a map which will be a valuable record when completed. Much anxiety was expressed on all sides, and it is certainly desirable that there should be a power of appeal from the decision of the Settlement Commissioner. It will not do to have an appeal to any ordinary legal tribunal, because, from the nature of the claims, the materials for any strictly judicial decision do not as yet exist. The object is to create the foundation for a legal title, and till this is done, legal tribunals have not the first requisite for any decision which can satisfy either legal or equitable requirements. I think all reasonable demands will be met by allowing an appeal to a tribunal composed of the Administrators of the Transvaal and of Griqualand West and the Settlement Commissioner. The Administrators will be able to obtain any legal advice they may require from their respective Attorney-Generals, and if one of them concurs in a doubtful case with the Settlement Commissioner, it may be concluded that the best has been done under a choice of difficulties. There will be, at least, an end of strife, which, after all, is the utmost that can be reasonably expected in such a case.

As in the Griqualand West Court, it is proposed that all claims to farms allowed by the Court should be confirmed by lapse of time (three months), and that if no appeal is entered within that period the decision shall be final.

A period of, say two months, should be fixed from the date of notification, beyond which no public claim can be filed.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Governor and High Commissioner.

Cape Town,
September 8th, 1879.

THE TRANSVAAL QUESTION.

Reprinted from the 'Times' of March 29, 1883.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'TIMES.'

Sir,

I would ask you to allow me to offer a few remarks on the questions at issue between the Bechuana tribes and their neighbours in the Transvaal.

Reference has been made to pledges said to have been given

by myself and by the late Sir George Colley, as though the claims of the Bechuanas to assistance from the British Government in protecting them from disturbance in the peaceful possession of their lands rested on some promises of mine or his. But, as far as I know, in my own case at least, no such promises were made, beyond general exhortations to loyalty and those assurances as to the finality of the annexation of the Transvaal which I made in the exact terms conveyed to me by Her Majesty's Government for communication to all concerned.

After I was superseded in the conduct of affairs in the Transvaal, similar assurances as to the finality of the annexation were repeated in yet more emphatic terms by Sir Garnet (now Lord) Wolseley, and by Her Majesty's present Ministers in various speeches, published despatches, and utterances, notably in the words inserted in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Session which followed the outbreak of the Boer rebellion.

But none of these utterances can have more than an indirect bearing on the question raised in the Transvaal debate, which is, not what the Bechuanas may have expected before the Convention of August, 1881, but what they had a right to expect then and since.

The cost and risk of now acting up to the terms of the Pretoria Convention may be small or great. That is an after question. The immediate issue raised by the debate is whether, having made a Convention with the Boers in August, 1881—a Convention which, if observed, would effectually protect the native races—we are now bound to insist on the Transvaal obligations in that Convention being carried out? or whether we are at liberty to decline so to insist, basing our refusal on the plea that, however imperative on us may be the enforcement of the Convention, we think the performance of our duty will be costly or troublesome?

All Mr. Gladstone's arguments against honestly carrying out the Convention may, or may not, be perfectly sound. But, if sound, the question becomes yet more obvious, Why was the Convention made? Mr. Gladstone does not plead imperfect knowledge of the difficulties and dangers. On the contrary, he states that he knew them very thoroughly many years ago. Had he forgotten them when he made the Convention? If not, what has happened since to make him wish to evade obligations so deliberately and so recently undertaken by Her Majesty's present Government when, less than two years ago, he made the Convention as a part of the conditions of peace to induce the victorious Boers to withdraw from the British territory of Natal, where they had successfully defied the

sovereignty of England after three times repulsing the British troops and killing the Queen's representative ?

Whether any answer which can be given to this question will, or will not, be satisfactory to the people of England I do not pretend to anticipate. But I would offer a few remarks on the pleas hitherto advanced, as excuses for not enforcing the terms of the Convention as regards the Bechuana people, who are neighbours of our own to the north of Griqualand, as well as neighbours of the Transvaal. Let me first say that Mr. Forster's admirable speech on the 16th of March anticipates much which I might have wished to observe regarding this Bechuana question, and I can, from personal knowledge, testify to the truth of the most important facts stated by him.

I do not propose to dwell on the case of the natives within the present Transvaal boundary, strong as were the obligations voluntarily undertaken by Her Majesty's Government towards them. The plea now urged against present interference by the British Government in behalf of natives inhabiting the Transvaal within the boundaries of that Republic, and legally its subjects, is the state of the country and of the Transvaal administration generally. I will not now go into the questions, How far this plea is valid ? or, whether a powerful Government like England was justified in handing over the lives and property of 700,000 human beings to another authority without ascertaining beforehand whether that authority was strong enough to enforce laws for their future protection and well-being ? Let us also pass over for the present, as falling within the newly-settled Transvaal frontier, the specially strong claims the natives in the "Keate Award" territory have on us for protection against ill-treatment by the Transvaal Government. Whatever may be said in bar of the British Government interfering to protect natives within the Tranvaal boundary as fixed eighteen months ago, none of the arguments seem to me to apply to British intervention for the protection of Bechuanas who live altogether outside the Transvaal boundary so recently fixed and agreed on, and whose claims on us for protection date, not only from the Convention of 1881, but from a date long anterior to the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877.

The case of the Bechuanas generally is stated by Mr. Forster with equal force and truth ; and still more fully by the Rev. John Mackenzie in a paper entitled "Bechuanaland, the Transvaal, and England," and printed for the London Missionary Society—a paper which every one who wishes to know the rights of this question would do well to study carefully.

Sixty years ago these Bechuanas were described by English

travellers as a nation of peaceful natives, no longer nomads, but settled in an open prairie country, akin to the Basuto Kaffirs in race and language, but habitually abstaining from aggressions on their neighbours, and much more advanced than the other Kaffir races in civilization and many industrial arts. More than fifty years ago, and before the Trek Boers arrived north of the Vaal, the London Missionary Society established missionaries in Bechuanaland. Moffat and Livingstone laboured there, and the missions at all the Bechuana chief towns have been remarkably successful, not only in making converts, but in gradually and permanently civilizing the people. Their settled habits have been confirmed; they have steadily advanced in civilization and in the arts of industry and peace; they are clothed and often educated as well as the ordinary white traders, and have separate property in land as well as in cattle. Mr. Forster, in his speech, describes how Sir George Grey, as Governor of the Cape about twenty-five years ago, intervened to put an end to frontier disturbances between the Bechuanas and the advancing Trek Boers. Since that time the Bechuanas have been little disturbed, and have given no just cause of complaint to their Transvaal neighbours. Sometimes the chief has headed his people in their progress toward civilization, like Kama, the chief of Bamangwato, who administers the affairs of his people as well as any European magistrate, and to the complete satisfaction of numerous Europeans, missionaries, and traders, Dutch as well as English, who live in security and comfort at his chief town, Shoshong. He helps to build churches and schools, which are looked after by himself and his wife, and I never heard a word against him implying any doubt of his good faith, or loyalty to his engagements, or duties to his people, to the English Government, or to his neighbours the Boers.

But in other cases a petty chief has adhered to his old uncivilized ways, while the most active and progressive of his family and people have followed the leading of the missionaries and other European teachers. Gradually, in such cases, the feudal power of the chief decayed, and though there was peace and progress in Bechuanaland, mainly through missionary influence, and much prosperity owing to the development of the neighbouring Diamond Fields, the chiefs lost power to meet emergencies requiring extraordinary energy or vigour. Such an emergency occurred in 1878, when a wave of native discontent swept through South Africa, broke out in the Gaika and Galeka war, and in native risings in Griqualand East and West. The Griqualand West rebels,

defeated by the energetic action of the Administration—Colonel (now Sir Owen) Lanyon and Colonel Warren—retired into Bechuanaland. The loyal chiefs were unable to resist them. Some who were disaffected joined them, but, as a rule, the Bechuana people give practical proof of the good results of their missionary teaching by aiding to uphold law and order as symbolized by the supremacy of the neighbouring British Government.

Everywhere, however, the decay of the old tribal authority of the chiefs became evident, and several of those of Southern Bechuanaland formally resigned their authority, and begged that the British Government would undertake their protectorate. But neither the Cape Government nor Her Majesty's Government assented to assume the responsibility.

I had received from those who knew the country best the materials for providing an administration, through native agency, under a competent European political agent, on the system which answers so well in the less civilized portions of India. But before I could obtain the sanction of the home authorities to the plan, which I believe chiefs and people, missionaries and traders, would all have approved, I was superseded, and the idea of permitting a British protectorate in Bechuanaland was, for the time, abandoned. Since then the revolt of the Transvaal and our retirement have left the Bechuanas face to face with Boer aggression, just as they were when Sir George Grey first intervened in 1858. The practical question now is, Shall we maintain or shall we abandon the policy of Sir George Grey, which for a quarter of a century has been so successful? Shall we require the Transvaal rulers to observe their solemn obligations entered into less than two years ago, and assist them in doing so? Or shall we fold our hands and allow the Bechuanas to be "eaten up" by filibusters from the Transvaal?

I say "filibusters from the Transvaal," because though the Transvaal Government might have done much to check, if not to prevent, the aggressions now complained of, the outrages are said to be for the most part the work of filibusters, not of the recognised agents of the Transvaal Government, and I believe are disapproved of by a great proportion of the respectable Boers, and might be checked if the central government were better able to restrain the lawless. There are, I know, among the Boers some as upright and honourable as any English gentleman can be; and I feel sure that if they had to deal with an English agent, whom they trusted and respected, and on whose word they relied, he would not fail to receive much moral support from their influence. But they suffer

from the power assumed by the lawless and unscrupulous portion of the population as much as we suffer from their want of confidence in our courage, constancy, and good faith.

What can England now do? To regain the confidence we have lost is an arduous but not, I think, an impossible task.

Whatever difficulties may beset any interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, we are, it seems to me, bound at least to do all we can to perform our obligations outside the limits we have recognised as bounding the authority of the Transvaal Government. Let us leave for the moment the consideration of our obligations on the eastern frontier towards Natal, the Swazies, and the Zulus, as well as those in the Keate Award, and consider only those on the western frontier towards Bechuanaland proper. The government of the Transvaal can claim no sort of right to protect filibusters who invade the country west of the boundary as defined in August, 1881. Let them keep strictly to that line, and, while we see that no native west of it commits aggressions in the Transvaal, let us insist that the native population outside that boundary is protected from causeless aggression from the east. Much is said of the immense and indefinite responsibilities of any such protectorate; but nothing can be further from the truth than the estimates of those responsibilities which I have seen put forward. The first essential is trustworthy information on which Her Majesty's Government can safely rely for the facts on which it is to act; and for this purpose a single competent English officer, chosen for such qualities as are successful in winning the confidence alike of natives and Europeans, is not difficult to select. Let him be charged, first of all, to report what he finds has really happened west of the boundary line, and then what he can recommend as a system to prevent aggressions on either side in the future. Let him be appointed by and held responsible to the Governor of the Cape and the High Commissioner, and report to him, and let him be as free as possible from race prejudice or bias. All this can easily be effected without any dispatch of English troops. It was effected by Colonels Sir Owen Lanyon and Warren in 1878-80 with no materials save such as can be found on the spot. Volunteers of the Diamond Fields did all that was wanted under far more difficult circumstances than the present, without hardly any assistance from Her Majesty's regular forces. Nothing can be more unfounded than the fear that this need lead us into indefinite responsibilities or great expense. The area of the political agent's action would be the Bechuana country, with well-defined borders—viz. to the south, the British colonial territory of Griqualand West; the Molopo river and the waterless

Kalahari desert to the north and west; and the well-defined Transvaal boundary as settled in August, 1881, to the east. His duties would be confined to the chiefs of the Bechuana tribes. The political agent would be bound to assist the Transvaal farmers in recovering stolen cattle and in settling any frontier disputes, and there can be no doubt that any statements he might send to the Resident at Pretoria would command more respect from the Transvaal Government than the reports now received from unofficial sources.

It has been said that our protectorate fails to protect the natives intended to be protected, and that it does them more harm than good. The Bechuanas certainly do not think so, and in their case, at least, it is a choice between protection, or destruction by a process of slow extinction and expulsion.

The expense, again, is spoken of as a difficulty; but the Government can easily calculate the cost of a house, such as the missionaries have at Kuruman or Shoshong, a mule waggon and horses such as a trading traveller uses, and pay such as befits a military officer so employed, with a few mounted orderlies as messengers and personal escort.

This would be the sole expense of the first steps necessary to enable us to discharge a portion of the duties which Her Majesty's Government voluntarily undertook by the Treaty and Convention of August, 1881.

So far from being offensive to the settled and respectable Dutch population in the neighbourhood of the frontier, I feel assured that the appointment of such an officer would be welcomed by those Boers who have the best claim to patriotism. No doubt there would be some attempt at an outcry from the advocates of disorder, and the outcry might pretend to be an expression of colonial feeling; but I believe it is nothing short of injustice to the respectable inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, as well as the Cape Colony, to suppose that they approve of filibustering expeditions like those of which we now hear or that they would not welcome some one with authority to prevent the frontier disturbances which they fell to be no more creditable to the Transvaal Government than to us. Let us give them the credit for being as anxious to do their duty, when they see it clearly, as we are.

It is said that the Bechuana chiefs have only themselves to blame for giving occasion to filibustering interference through their own quarrels and aggressions on the Boers. Nothing can be more unjust and true than the misrepresentations with which these assertions are supported.

The internal dissensions which can be quoted among the Bechuanas are generally simply disputed claims to chieftain-

ship. It is, of course, always possible to dispute in Bechuanaland (as of old in the Highlands of Scotland) who has the best right to be considered chief of the clan; but unless fomented by external interference, such disputes would be easily settled, without bloodshed, by reference to the Political Agent and his council of native headmen, and could never inconvenience a neighbouring State like the Transvaal. As for aggressions by Bechuanas on the Transvaal, I can find no official evidence of anything of the kind, and I doubt whether, if fairly sifted, anything could be quoted as justifying interference. On these points there are unexceptionable witnesses at hand, not only the Rev. John Mackenzie and many other missionaries, whose statements of fact may be implicitly relied on, but officers like Sir Owen Lanyon, Colonel Warren, and Captain Harrel, and gentlemen like the Hon. Guy Dawnay, the member for the North Riding, who has travelled over the district in question, and would be accepted alike by Boers and Bechuanas as an unexceptionable witness.

Mr. Gladstone observed that the hon. member for the North Riding "apparently spoke without the slightest consciousness that South Africa had a history;" but Mr. Gladstone must surely have forgotten one of the clearest facts established by all South African history when he lamented the absence of any paramount chief in Bechuanaland, and spoke as though the existence of such a chief in Zululand had been a safeguard against misgovernment and aggression on neighbours.

If there is one fact which comes out more clearly than any other in the history of all our dealings with the natives in South Africa it is this—that no paramount chief, whether raised to power by his own force of character, or selected and fostered by us, has ever been anything but a curse to his people, and the most serious obstacle to their civilization and to peace between them and their neighbours. It might be otherwise if the paramount chief had been placed under the strict control of a British political agent—a system which we have never tried, with any attempt at perseverance, in South Africa, though it has been so invariably successful in India. The history of Gaika, from the Dutch Governor Jansen's first treaty with him, of Chaka, Dingaan, and Cetywayo, of Sandili, of Hintza, of Kreli—of Pondos, of Basutos, and Zulus, all point to the same moral.

A paramount chief in South Africa obtains his power by superior force and the suppression of all law and right other than his own supreme will. His power is the force of barbarism. He cannot be created by our selection for any beneficent purpose; he cannot be maintained by help from us,

without danger to the lives and liberties of all around him, for the invariable use he makes of our support is to aggrandise his own power of uncontrolled self-will, and of the oppression, cruelty, and bloodshed which satisfy that will. This is the true picture of a paramount chief in South Africa, if we look for it in history, instead of drawing it from imagination. The only paramount authority which we can create or support, without inflicting innumerable evils on the people and their neighbours, is an English official entrusted with sufficient powers, and charged to do right, and execute justice according to English ideas, but through native machinery of administration, and to give security of life and property to the people, as well as to the petty chiefs, as long as the latter make no pretensions to irresponsible paramount authority. In such case the force which supports the chief is the force of civilization, of law, and of order, and is itself under the control of law.

Much has been said of the indefinite expense into which such a system as I advocate might lead us.

I agree with Mr. Forster in believing that if the English Government were known to be in earnest, no expense need be incurred beyond that of a Resident in Bechuanaland, and a very small body of border police, the cost of which might, I am satisfied, be met by a voluntary hut tax, which the Bechuanas would be only too glad to pay for protection in the peaceful possession of their country, as do the Zulus in Natal. At any rate, if we once knew the real facts, on unquestionable evidence, such as a British Resident's Report would afford us, there need be no thought of military expeditions till there had been ample time to count the cost of doing whatever the Resident's report showed it was necessary to do.

How much it may be worth while to spend in keeping such solemn and deliberate engagements as we have made in the Convention of 1881 is a problem I cannot pretend to solve, and which few Englishmen, I should hope, would wish to calculate. But it is easy for any one to count a part, though it can only be a small part, of the cost of breaking our promises.

What will be the expense of now folding our arms and doing nothing?

No one, I suppose, doubts now that we have, to some extent at least, lost character by entering into the Convention of August, 1881. When that Convention was made, and we evacuated the Transvaal, there were, roughly speaking, 700,000 of the older inhabitants of the country who wished us to stay and rule them, and 45,000, at the outside, of new comers,

every man of whom had arrived there within living memory, and of whom it was said that a majority—but certainly not the whole—wished us to go. After a series of military defeats we broke one set of very solemn engagements to those who wished us to stay, and we evacuated the country, leaving 700,000 original inhabitants to be ruled by the nominal majority of the 45,000; but hoping, as was then pleaded, that our motives of self-denial in declining the trouble and expense of doing our duty and keeping our promises would be appreciated, and would secure the good treatment of the 700,000 by the 45,000; and, further, to ensure such good treatment for them, we made the Convention of August, 1881.

Can any one suppose, in the face of the Blue-book revelations, that such good treatment has been secured, or that the Convention has obtained for us the respect of either Boers or natives?

The Convention, we know well, has not been observed. The question now arises, Shall we say we intend to insist on its observance, and say it with earnestness, as men who mean what they say?

What will be the effect of our now deliberately telling the people of South Africa that we find the task we undertook in 1881, of holding the Boers to their engagements in favour of the natives, too onerous for us to attempt to perform it?—that for the second time, and more deliberately, and without any excuse of change of the Queen's advisers in England, we must decline to perform our engagements?

Must not the effect inevitably be to increase the Boers' distrust of our word; to confirm their belief that we are not to be trusted; and that, whenever it is our interest, we shall break our engagements with them as readily, for any selfish considerations, as we have done our engagements in favour of the natives?

It is easy to say that the good or bad opinion of the Boers need not concern us; but any low estimate of our power or will to perform our engagements must affect very seriously our position in South Africa.

First, there can be no doubt that the British hold on Griqualand West, as a portion of the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, would be seriously imperilled. Many unruly spirits in the Transvaal and Orange Free State cast longing eyes at the Diamond Fields. The prize to them is worth striving for; even in unsettled times more than £4,000,000 sterling in value of rough diamonds have been annually dug from the barren wastes of Griqualand West, and the greater portion has gone to enrich Europeans.

Filibusters, once successful in Bechuanaland, would, beyond doubt, say, "If the British Government could be terrified, first into relaxing its former hold on the Transvaal, and next into repudiating the protection of the Bechuanas, why should they not be amenable to the reasoning of unprovoked violence, and be induced to withdraw from the Diamond Fields in the Cape Colony?

These are no imaginary speculations, as any one who reads the South African newspapers may soon see. The regular governments of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal might, and I believe would, disapprove of any attempt to carry out such a programme, but they would find the temptation to the lawless section of their subjects far greater than any yet offered, and they may plead as we do, the difficulty and expense of doing right, and that they are not bound to defend our border if we cannot defend it for ourselves.

But a considerable section of advanced politicians in England are in the habit of saying, "Perish British South Africa, what interest have we in it, except as a troublesome appendage to the Cape peninsula? Let us turn that into a Gibraltar, and leave colonists and natives of all nationalities to fight out the battle for supremacy among themselves, and trust to our new doctrine of 'survival of the fittest.'"

Let us count the cost of this mode of cutting the Gordian knot.

At present in ordinary times, with our command of the ocean and our sovereignty over the Cape Colony and Natal, to hold the Cape requires one regiment at Cape Town, and a couple more, with a proportion of artillery, in Natal and elsewhere. In time of war we might always rely on a large force of colonial volunteers, to supplement any reinforcements we might have to send. But to convert the Cape peninsula into a Gibraltar, with a hostile or neutral continent behind it, would require in time of peace as well as in time of war two or three times the garrison which would be needed to hold Gibraltar.

I need not enter into details to prove this. Let any one with a good map before him study the history of the two occupations of the Cape by British troops in the great revolutionary war in 1795 and 1806, and any military critic will see that I have understated the case.

The Cape is not, as of old, the only or principal key to all our Indian and China trade, but it is a great safeguard for more than half that trade, and very essential to our best alternative route should the Suez Canal ever be threatened or

stopped up. It is essential also to the protection of all the Atlantic Ocean trade to Australia and South America, which hardly existed when the possession of the Cape was the great object of colonial contest between Great Britain and the confederated naval Powers of Continental Europe.

Our commercial rivals are well aware that no single blow could be inflicted which would injure our shipowners and our seaborne commerce so much as the loss of the Cape, and any repudiation of our engagements to the Bechuana tribes would bring us perilously near the necessity for increasing the garrison and fortifications of the Cape peninsula, till they cost us more than the present charge for Gibraltar, and infinitely more than the whole present cost of South Africa.

There is, then, no economy, present or prospective, in repudiating our engagements to the Bechuanas.

Let me add a few words on the apprehensions which have been expressed that in doing our duty to the Bechuanas we might aggravate a hostile feeling between Dutch and English in South Africa.

I speak with some confidence when I say that any anti-English feeling which existed among the European population in Cape Colony and Natal thirty years ago had been gradually decreasing up to the time I left the Cape. The grant of representative institutions, increased mercantile and mining prosperity, and other causes had aided this result. Any change which has since taken place is clearly traceable to the successful Boer outbreak and to our want of perseverance and success in putting it down; but the present anti-English feeling is not, if I may judge from what I hear and read, the old soreness of national jealousies, but a new-born feeling of mingled anger, shame and contempt for the English Government, to which the English-born section of colonists, angry and ashamed at the part we have played in the Transvaal, have contributed as much if not more than those of other lineage. But this feeling seemed for some months past to be passing away. It may well be revived by the tone now adopted by Ministerial speeches in late debates. But I feel sure that if Her Majesty's Government would adopt a different tone, would state decidedly that they meant to uphold the Convention of August, 1881, in its integrity, do their duty to the utmost of their power in respecting, and causing to be respected, their engagements to both natives and Europeans, and give to the Government of the Transvaal credit at least for good intentions, assisting them to give effect to those intentions, they might gradually regain the respect they have

lost, and restore that feeling of attachment to Her Majesty's Government which I found actuated the best and most influential portion of colonial society, whether of English or Dutch origin, when I lived among them.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

H. B. E. FRERE.

March 26th, 1883.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'TIMES.'

Written to the 'Times,' April 9th, 1883.*

Sir,

The importance of the subject induces me again to ask room for a few observations on matters of fact connected with the Bechuanaland question.

As regards a general but very erroneous impression, that "Bechuanaland lies far beyond our borders, and is of little interest to us, either politically or commercially," I would observe that reference to any map of South Africa shows, on the contrary, that Bechuanaland bounds the Cape Colony to the north for several hundred miles. The frontier is not more than sixty or seventy miles from Kimberley, the capital of the Diamond Fields in the Cape Colony, which draws a great portion of its daily supplies of cattle, sheep, firewood, grain, forage, and vegetables from Bechuanaland, besides large quantities of wool for export to England.

When I was at Kimberley in 1879 I used to see numbers of Bechuana dealers daily in the market which supplies the town. They are not "red blanket" savages, like many of the Kaffir races; but well dressed in European clothing, and well spoken of by the intelligent European population as satisfactory people to deal with.

Kimberley, besides its annual exports to England of more than £4,000,000 in value of diamonds, is a centre of considerable and growing English trade, with all parts of the interior of South Africa; and I am sure no trader in Kimberley, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, or Natal would consider the fate of Bechuanaland a matter of indifference, either politically or commercially.

In a price current in a London newspaper I lately noted thirty companies, whose places of business are in Kimberley,

* Extracts published in the 'Times,' December 5th, 1884.

but whose shares are bought and sold in London, and many of the recipients of whose dividends and earnings live and pay rates and taxes in this country. The fluctuations of trade in Kimberley vitally affect every commercial centre in South Africa, and are sensibly felt in our manufacturing towns and workmen's cottages here in England.

What do our mercantile authorities say on this subject? In the 'Economist,' of March 24, is a thoughtful article on "The Financial Aspect of the South African Question." The 'Economist' observes, that there can be very little doubt indeed "that at present the commercial and financial welfare of South Africa has been checked by the want of harmony subsisting between the Dutch and English. The great bound made by the Cape Colony subsequent to the diamond discoveries has been followed by an ominous pause. The national revenue has been decreasing, trade is depressed, there are disputes of a fiscal character with the Dutch Republic, to check commercial intercourse, and certainly, if banking profits are any guide to prosperity, the reaction must be considerable."

After giving instances of banking depression, the 'Economist' continues: "All our commercial advices from South Africa are of the same gloomy character," and concludes as follows:—

"Time and judicious handling have, however, cooled down many and yet more burning questions, and we have sufficient belief in the ultimate good sense of the Boer population not to provoke us too far. In wishing to live in harmony with them, we desire their advancement as well as our own; and they must sooner or later learn the lesson that, as neither the English nor the natives can be removed from South Africa, their present intolerance will have to be abated."

In a yet more recent article (March 31st) the 'Economist' draws attention to the fact that while the 4 per cent. loans of other colonies stand at from 99½ to 103 (the price of Canadian 4 per cents.) the 4 per cent. loans of the Cape and Natal Colonies stand at only 95, and explains the difference by observing that "unlike the English, Dutch, and blacks in Southern Africa" the English, French, and Indians of the Dominion of Canada, and the English and blacks of the West Indies, "are content to work harmoniously together in the interests of their common country." Every newspaper and every letter I have seen dealing with this subject, from the South African point of view, confirms what the 'Economist' says, and the ablest and best informed usually attribute the greater part of the present commercial depression to political causes, and notably to the course taken by Her Majesty's

Government here in England in abdicating their position as arbiters between rival aspirants for power in South Africa.

In face of such facts, can it be truly said that this question of Bechuanaland is of no interest to us, politically or commercially?

Much has been said of the difficulties of doing our duty in Bechuanaland, owing to the distance and expense of enforcing our authority; but such excuses will not avail in face of the fact that eight years ago, when the Diamond Fields were in precisely the same state of disorder from the very same causes which afflict Bechuanaland now (that is, from the lawless proceedings of unauthorized intruders, who set aside the native chiefs and tried to set up governments of their own, with a pretence of independence), Sir Henry Barkly, then Governor of the Cape Colony, sent a small force, well chosen and well-equipped, under an able and experienced officer, Sir Arthur Cunynghame, and the republics, self-constituted by foreign intruders, disappeared, and order was restored at very small expense (I think £10,000, which was repaid by the colony) without, I believe, the loss of a single life, and the district has since been a mine of wealth, contributing in a most remarkable degree to the commercial prosperity not only of all South Africa but of this country also.

Again, there is the fact that when all South Africa was disturbed by native risings and wars, and Bechuanaland was invaded by rebels from the English colony five years ago, order was restored by Colonels Lanyon and Warren, with scarcely the aid of a single regular soldier.

Nothing can be more opposed to fact than the statement that the Bechuanas are to blame for their present difficulties. It is not even alleged that they have given any cause of offence, just or unjust, to the Transvaal Government, or to any of their neighbours.

They have a country which, under missionary teaching, they have rendered valuable to themselves, to their neighbours, and especially to Kimberley, a centre of British trade and enterprise.

Foreign adventurers from a distance, without a shadow of claim to right, want to take that country from them; the Bechuanas are weak, and we refuse them the aid which has been afforded to their aggressors in supplies of guns and ammunition.

This refusal would be quite right if we did our own duty, as just arbiters, in a dispute which affects our own interests, as well as the rights of others; but if we mean to hold aloof

and pretend to neutrality, the aid given to the invaders of Bechuanaland is difficult to explain or defend.

Meantime, whilst we are ignoring the geographical position of Bechuanaland, and discussing imaginary difficulties, as excuses for not doing what our duty, as well as our interest, requires and demands, the freebooters, colonial and foreign, including, we are told, some sixty deserters from the British army, are acting. A recent instance is better than a mere opinion.

In the 'Times' of March 26 was a telegram from the 'Times' correspondent at Durban, Natal, stating that "the Pretoria newspapers contain a favourable account of Stellaland, the new territory in the south west, where farmers are settling in large numbers, and a duly constituted Government has established itself."

Do our Government, or your readers, the British public, recognise what and where this "Stellaland" is?

Having never before heard of such a region, I made inquiry, and found that "Stellaland" is the name given by the marauding invaders to the land of which they have, during the last few weeks, possessed themselves in Bechuanaland, and which they have called "Stellaland," from the "Star" on the flag which they carried in their marauding expeditions.

I was referred for further information to the 'Scotsman' of the 8th of last month (March), in which it is stated that the Boers and European adventurers who have hitherto figured as "Volunteers," assisting this chief or that, have so far completed the conquest of the country, that they have marked out as their own a territory they now claim, extending westward from the Transvaal boundary to the Ka-la-hari desert, and unauthorised by us, by the rightful native owners, by the Transvaal, or by any other recognised Government, they have seized on a slice of territory, dividing Bechuanaland in two, and cutting off one of the best and most direct roads from Kimberley into the interior.

How many readers of the 'Times' telegram of March 26th can have understood that the "Stellaland" they read of was really a portion of the friendly and peaceful native territory of Bechuanaland, thus forcibly appropriated by marauders? The 'Scotsman' adds, that the name of Volunteers has now been dropped, the authority of the chiefs has long been set aside. A newspaper published in Kimberley, is the medium through which this band of adventurers now address themselves to the outside world. One column is headed "Stellaland Government Gazette Notices." The Notices are signed "G. J.

Van Niekerk, Chairman of the Committee of Management," and are dated from "Vryburg (Free Town), Stellaland."

The 'Scotsman' then quotes from this Government Gazette some of these "Notices."

1. "That the lotteries of the Volunteers' farms will take place on the 23rd of February, 1883" (which means apparently that the lands, which these marauders have occupied, will be then divided by lot amongst themselves).

2. "That the Land Commission will show owners of farms their 'beacons' (i.e. their boundaries) gratis, during a period of one month, after which the charge will be £1 10*s.* per beacon." (These so-called "owners" are apparently to be the fortunate drawers in the lottery.)

3. "Tariff of Licenses. Shop licenses in town £12; liquor licenses, bottle and glass, £25; liquor licenses, wholesale in town, £15; traders' licenses for three months for 3000 lbs. or less, £7 10*s.*; traders' licenses for three months for 3000 lbs. or less, with liquor, £15; traders entering township for fifteen days, £3."

4. "That new 'intrekkers' (immigrants) intending to reside in this territory, shall, within eight days of their arrival, report themselves to the nearest Field Cornet, and within fifteen days, swear the oath of allegiance to this State."

The 'Scotsman' adds: "Attention has been repeatedly called in these columns to the movements of these freebooters, whose numbers are said to be swelled by desertions from our own army, and who have devastated a country adjacent to the Cape Colony."

The 'Scotsman' further refers to the warning given by Her Majesty's Government to the Transvaal Government that its boundary must not be extended westwards, and to the fact that "Stellaland" does extend across our right of way northward into the interior of the South African continent, a right hitherto conceded to our traders by all the native chiefs. It calls attention to the vexatious tariff established by these freebooters, which must seriously interfere with legitimate trade on that route; and, above all, its calls attention "to the abominable liquor traffic"—the promotion of which seems the main principle of the tariff—(traffic in liquor, I may observe, is strictly forbidden by Kama and others of the native chiefs.

I am told that there is a second so called "Republic"—that of "Goshen"—set up by these marauders, and, like "Stellaland," assuming all the airs of a regularly constituted government.

Aggressions of this kind are nothing new. They have been frequently attempted before. Cases of the kind were brought

to my notice when I was at Kimberley in 1879, but they were promptly and effectually checked, without resistance or bloodshed, by small parties of Griqualand police, who had been stationed in the Bechuana country by Colonel Warren, R.E. (then administering the government of Griqualand West), for the preservation of order in those disturbed times.

But I would ask my countrymen whether it is to a self-appointed government like that of "Stellaland" or "Goshen," that they are prepared to surrender the results of the labours of Livingstone and Moffat, and of all who have laboured as they did to civilize and elevate by the teaching of Christianity the people of Bechuanaland.

Can it be said that the usurpation of a portion of Bechuanaland and the establishment of such a filibustering State as "Stellaland," within three score miles of Kimberley—about as far as London is from Portsmouth or Dover—can be a subject of little interest to those who have commercial relations with Kimberley, or with the chief marts of South Africa, to whose commerce the destinies of Kimberley are of very vital importance? What is the position of the Transvaal in the matter? Even if we are to give every weight to any excuses which can be made for the Transvaal Government, and to any reasons for our not now interfering, as Suzerain, or in any other capacity, with the internal affairs of the Transvaal, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that these Bechuanaland proceedings are clearly *outside* the limits assigned to the Transvaal by the Convention of August, 1881; and supposing the Transvaal people to be acting in good faith, they are as much interested as we are in checking marauding on their borders. They cannot reasonably object to our appointing a Resident to represent the English Government as protecting Bechuanaland—to restrain the Bechuanas from molesting the Transvaal subjects; or trespassing over the Border, as well as to represent accurately, and with authority, to the Transvaal Government any wrongs the the Bechuanas may suffer from Transvaal subjects, to maintain, in fact, an efficient Border police, for the prevention of trespassing and cattle-thieving on either side the frontier, in an open country, where the character of the population does not require any display of much force to maintain order.

A complete and practical scheme for carrying out such a protectorate was included in a Report submitted by Captain Harrel to Her Majesty's Government in 1880. In it detailed statistics were given of the territory whose chiefs had asked to be taken under British protection, and to be ruled, through European agents, responsible to the High Commissioner at

the Cape. The whole cost was to have been met by local taxation, as in Natal, and no charge need fall on Imperial or Cape Colonial revenues, when once the plan is in operation.

For reasons with which I need not now trouble you, such a plan would be far easier to carry out now, than it would have been at the time it was submitted.

Reference has been made to an idea put forward by ministerial apologists, that the aggrieved Bechuanas may be transplanted. No one who knows the country could entertain the slightest hope of such a plan succeeding. Even if the chiefs could be transplanted, how could their people be moved? and where could they be placed safe from a repetition of "Stellaland" aggressions? The only practical plan of preserving them from extermination is to protect them where they are, and where, unlike all other Kaffir tribes, they have been since the earliest travellers first heard of them.

Mr. Forster truly said that force was not likely to be needed "if we were known to be in earnest." He was met by the taunt that "being in earnest" meant being prepared to support right by force. But is not this true of the enforcement of every right, and of every law? What else has the policeman to enforce his authority but the conviction that he is in earnest, and so is the Government and society behind him, and that they will, if necessary, use force to support him?

Why does Her Majesty's Government hesitate to act? I trust I have already shown how flimsy is the excuse that the region of Bechuanaland is too remote to concern us; whether we have, or have not, any moral obligations, it is clear we have very important material interests at stake there.

It has been said, as an excuse for inaction, that the Convention of 1881 "gave us only a right, but not an obligation to interfere."

Can any reasoning be more calculated to create distrust in the Boer mind? Whether the Boers agree or not with us in our notions of obligation, they must feel that to keep a right of this kind suspended over their heads, but never exercised, is as dangerous for them, as it is discreditable for us, if it is avowedly a right of interference, whose exercise depends, not on obligations of humanity or good faith, but of unalloyed self-interest. In such case the conclusion is inevitable, that, whenever our self-interest is in favour of interference, we shall exercise our reserved right against them for our own profit.

Yet more provocative of colonial mistrust and hostility is the excuse given for our non-interference that "the Bechuanas are quite able to protect themselves, if they would give up their tribal feuds, and combine to resist the freebooting invaders."

I do not myself believe in the native power to do so. I believe such combination to be impossible, to any extent which could resist the onward pressure of European invasion. A native combination may occasion infinite bloodshed and misery, but it must ultimately fail to resist a pressure, which is, I am convinced, irresistible by any native force. It only rests with us to choose, whether this pressure shall be that of a civilizing, protecting, elevating sovereignty—like that which, under the British flag, educates the Cape Colonial Kaffirs, and qualifies them to be citizens of a free, civilized, self-governing state—or the pressure of an enslaving power, using such auxiliaries as the 'Stellaland Government Gazette' enumerates, to weaken opposition.

The Trek Boers themselves do not believe in the efficacy of native combinations. Experience teaches them that, especially in an open country like Bechuanaland, native combinations only accelerate and render more fatal the ultimate certainty of native defeat.

But they also know, by bitter personal experience, that such defeat of a native combination has always been preceded by a period of native license and atrocity. What will they, therefore, think of the suggestion and recommendation by our Government of such native combination?

The Boers do not share Mr. Gladstone's admiration of paramount chiefs. There are men, and women too, among the Boers who have detailed to me their personal recollections of such paramount chiefs as Chaka, Dingaan, and Moselekatze; and any one who recollects, as I do, the stories he has heard from those who themselves helped to defend their "laagers," when the fight was for dear life, and when all knew that, in case of failure to hold out, no quarter would be shown to age or sex, may well shudder to think of the effect on Boer feeling of any suggestion from our Government that the natives "should combine and defend themselves."

Instead of thus pitting race against race, let us recognise the truth, pointed out in the remarks I have quoted from the 'Economist,' that there are three races in South Africa, and that, until they learn to live in harmony, there can be no permanent peace or prosperity in those regions.

But how live in harmony? One of the three must guide the others. There is a proverbial difficulty in two men riding the same horse, unless one of them consent to sit behind. The difficulty is not lessened when there are three men to ride one steed. One must direct and guide the others. In this case which of the three shall it be?

The native system has its advocates. They would have us

respect, and re-establish, where it has been broken down, such a rule as that of Cetywayo; they would make barbarism supreme, and trust to some as yet unobserved process of natural evolution, to produce results different from those shown by the experience of all Africa during thousands of years past.

Whatever may be the merits of this system, it will clearly not suit either the Dutch or the English. It can only succeed when both races have been driven from South Africa. History, however, proves the white races to be stronger than the black, and any attempt to make the black races rule the white will surely fail, and will not, in the meantime, tend to that harmony of races, which the 'Economist' desires as necessary to peace and commercial prosperity in Africa as everywhere else.

The Dutch system has advocates, yet more numerous and sanguine, and with better reason. That system is seen at its best—not in the rough Border life of the states in South Africa, but in Java and other Dutch colonies. It is founded on views like those prevalent in England in Queen Anne's time, or in the Southern States of America before the late war. It regards the native races as Helots, or serfs, to be humanely treated, but not by nature capable of being placed on any sort of practical equality with the white races. It consequently does little to educate or raise the natives from their existing condition of barbarism; and, if it does not actually discourage missionary enterprise, it neither favours it nor expects any practically useful result from it. It might, however, produce a certain amount of superficial peace, and material prosperity, if the English with their views of native improvement could be expelled, and the more refractory of the native races be destroyed or driven out.

Lastly, we have the English system, on which we have acted most completely and successfully in India, and more partially in the Cape Colony. It recognises the essential legal equality of all races before the law, and their indefinite capacities for improvement—moral, social, and political—for which it is the duty of the State to afford free scope. The problem of how best to make the good and civilizing government of such races as the Kaffirs self-supporting in a financial point of view has been best solved by Natal, whilst to the Cape Colony belongs the honour of establishing a Constitution which recognises no special privileges nor disabilities of race or colour, and opens to the native African, as well as to the European and Africander, every political franchise, as the direct reward of industry and ability.

On these general lines we have, for two generations past,

with more or less uniformity and success, dealt with the native races in South Africa, and our Colonies have steadily grown to the proportions of a great Dominion. We have never failed of success, save when we deviated from our own principles, and attempted to combine two incompatible systems—either to patronize barbarism and rule on Kaffir principles, or to act on the sterner and exclusive system of our Dutch predecessors.

So far for colonial policy within the colonial borders. But the question now is, on which of these three classes of principles shall we rule or use our inevitable governing influence, over those who are beyond the pale of our colonial laws, and whose machinery of administration must be native, though the moving spirit may be either native barbarian or Dutch, or English?

Shall we leave our native protégés to their native ways and native destinies? In that case, whatever of European spirit has been infused by missionary teaching will be soon crushed out, and the native races, swept from the lands they have hitherto held, must be reduced, by the superior force of the white races, to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for the European intruders of some "Stellaland" or "Goshen" Republic, who will supplant the natives, and will rule them, when subdued, on the Dutch system.

Viewing these results as inevitable, it seems to me that we are under very positive and explicit obligations of humanity—good faith, self-interest, and sound policy—to extend our protectorate over the Bechuanas, and to rule them through their own headmen, on the principles, not of the barbarism from which they have emerged, nor of the Dutch colonial system with which they are now threatened, but of our own English administration, in India, in Canada, and in the old settled provinces of the Cape Colony and Natal.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. B. E. FRERE.

April 9th, 1883.

ENGLAND'S DUTY IN BECHUANALAND.

Reprinted from the 'Pall Mall Gazette' of November 26, 1883.

The 'Pall Mall Gazette' of the 7th of November gives a brief *résumé* of the arguments which the Rev. John McKenzie has so ably stated since his return to England. He recommends that Bechuanaland should be taken formally under the protection of England, and governed by an English official, subject to Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, but using for administrative purposes such local materials, of native chiefs and headmen and colonial Europeans, as he finds on the spot. The 'Times' of the 8th states that one of the objects of the visit of the Transvaal delegates to England is to obtain the removal of the boundary which limits Transvaal extension and dominion in the direction of Bechuanaland, and intimates that it is probable such a request made by the delegates would be granted by the Cabinet, and that Bechuanaland would be left for the Transvaal Government to deal with as it might think proper. It would be well if, before the decision of the Cabinet is irrevocably taken, the arguments for and against either plan could be impartially weighed.

In favour of the course foreshadowed in the 'Times,' the only argument that can be urged is that the Transvaal delegates ask for it. It is not pretended that the Transvaal has any right to Bechuanaland. They have received no provocation from the Bechuanas; no Transvaal rights have been infringed or threatened. The sole argument is that the Bechuanas have some things—lands, pasturage, roads, and water privileges—which the Transvaal may desire to have, and has the power to take, unless England exercises the power given by the Convention of 1881 to forbid Transvaal interference.

On the other hand, what are the arguments against this course? First, there are the rights of the Bechuanas, a people more than half reclaimed from utter barbarism by more than half a century of English missionary labour. They have surely some claim on English good offices and protection. No one can say, with any approach to truth, that they will be better off or more content under the Transvaal or under the Stellaland or Goshen Republics than they have been under the practical protectorate of the British Government from 1840 to 1880. It may be said, "Let them fight for their own rights and defend themselves." Whatever may be urged in

favour of such a course, let it be clearly understood that it is a new departure, at variance with our policy for many years past, and that it is a breach of the reasonable expectations which the Bechuanas have founded on that policy. In Sir George Grey's time, in Sir Philip Wodehouse's time, in Sir Henry Barkly's time, and up to the date of the Pretoria Convention, the Transvaal was clearly informed that England would not permit extensions of Transvaal frontier in the direction of Bechuanaland. When the boundary was doubtful or disputed, it was laid down by arbitration, the arbitrator chosen being an English official. All objections to the boundary so laid down were heard before the Pretoria Convention was signed, modifications were made in the Transvaal interest, and the boundary was finally fixed only two years and three months ago. If, then, we now withdraw and leave the Bechuanas to fight it out with the Transvaal Boers, let it be clearly understood that our doing so is a new policy, entirely opposed to our past practice and to our implied pledges under all Governments, Liberal as well as Conservative, during the past fifty years.

A second argument against the abandonment of Bechuanaland is grounded on the interests of the Cape Colony. A glance at the map is sufficient to show that it can never be for the interest of the Cape to allow any foreign power to extend itself from the Vaal westward to the Kalahari Desert, to intersect roads hitherto free from impost into the interior, and to possess the power of impeding trade by Custom-houses with a tariff which may be intentionally hostile, with a view to drive commerce into other channels. Every port from Cape Town to St. John's River carries on a large and increasing trade with the countries north of Bechuanaland; and every merchant in those ports knows that the apprehensions I have alluded to are not fanciful. I believe few of those merchants would deny that the best prospects for their own trade with the interior rest on the Bechuanaland routes into the interior remaining under British protection, free from foreign Custom-houses. Again, Bechuanaland and the native states beyond it to the north and north-east are among the best sources of labour supply to the Diamond Fields of the Cape Colony. The supply may at any time be cut off, or subjected to heavy taxation by the Transvaal, if the Transvaal commands the routes by which the labourers pass to and from their homes. Much stress has been laid on the argument that, if the Cape objects to the Transvaal extending its dominions over Bechuanaland, the Cape should itself undertake the protection of Bechuanaland against Transvaal aggression. But a

very little consideration of the facts will show the injustice and absurdity of this argument. Although the Cape is much interested in the freedom of routes through Bechuanaland, it does not follow that in the most prosperous times the Cape people would be willing to defend the Bechuanas against foreign aggression. The present happens to be a period of extreme depression of commerce and industry in all South Africa, but especially in the Cape Colony. The Cape people are seeking to be relieved from the responsibility of ruling Basutoland and the Transkei districts of Kaffraria. It is little less than mockery, at such a time, to ask the Cape to undertake fresh and distant reponsibilities. Nothing can be more erroneous than the prevalent notion that the Cape people are always anxious for an extension of their colony. Whatever may have been the case in former days, since I have known them they have always been most unwilling to assume the responsibilities of any extension of the Colonial limits. In the case of the Diamond Fields, Basutoland, and the Transkei Kaffraria, whilst always recognising the value of English as opposed to foreign rule, the Cape Parliament never willingly accepted the distant frontier province as an accession to their own colony, and in this the Parliament only reflected the general cautious feeling of the colony.

It may seem absurd to urge, as a third argument against an abandonment of Bechuanaland, that it would be very much against the true interest of the Transvaal itself to remove the border line and its restrictions, as defined by the Pretoria Convention; but I am convinced that every true friend of the Transvaal will soon agree with me, even if we should differ at present, on this point. Amid all its defects, the Convention of 1881 had, at least, this one undoubted merit—it defined the Transvaal boundaries, and in defining them gave the Transvaal one characteristic of every settled and civilized State which before was wanting. There can be no doubt that the clearly defined boundaries of the Orange Free State have been one important element in the steady growth of that thriving Republic, and that with undefined frontiers, and unlimited power of expansion, not all the sagacity of President Sir John Brand could have kept the Republic together. I believe that no more fatal gift could be bestowed on the Transvaal than an unlimited power of expansion, which would tempt some of the most active elements of Colonial life to exchange the steady industry of the old farm for the gambling enterprises of the filibuster. Extension of Transvaal rule westward up to the Kalahari desert might give farms to many Transvaal subjects who have them not at present, but would add nothing to the

real strength of the State. It would in many ways multiply the difficulties which beset its government. It would perpetuate and aggravate all the controversies arising from the different view of native rights and capacities which the people of the Transvaal generally take as compared with English philanthropists of the present day. The difference is not much greater than between our own views and those of our grandfathers on the same subject; but if any enemy of the Transvaal wishes to prevent a large and respected portion of the English people from from ever doing justice to the Transvaal Voortrekkers, he could not, in my opinion, desire a better means of effecting his purpose than by removing the frontier lines, and restrictions on frontier extension, provided by the Convention of 1881.

I should hope that the objections to an abandonment of Bechuanaland which I have already stated, on the grounds of justice, humanity, and sound policy, would outweigh all other considerations; but I cannot omit noticing, fourthly and lastly, the grave objections founded on the injury which such abandonment must inflict on our national interests. To rescind the restrictions which the Convention of 1881 imposes on indefinite expansion of Transvaal boundaries at the expense of neighbouring native States, must carry with it in effect, if not in terms, our abdication of the position we have hitherto practically held, as the paramount Power in South Africa. In such cases as have arisen during the last forty years between the Transvaal and the Bechuanas, England has hitherto held practically the position of arbiter,—not by treaty but by common consent, founded on the logic of facts and on the possession of power. To evade performance of the duties of arbiter, as we have done during the last two years, must weaken our power; but the rescission of a solemn act like the Convention of 1881, which gave formal expression to the rights and duties of arbiter, would be a formal abdication and renunciation of power. The concession so made to the Transvaal, leaving its subjects free to take as much as they please and all they can from their native neighbours, could not be withheld from the subjects of other Powers, nor, indeed, from our own; for when the paramount Power had disappeared by abdication, any one, whether British subject or foreigner, would only have to cross beyond our colonial border, occupy another man's farm, and assume independence; he would at once enter the region where might is right, and could not logically be restrained from acts, however piratical they might be, which we should thus have formally declared we would not restrain when done by the descendants of those Voortrekkers who left the Cape

Colony only forty years before the more recent filibuster. But a country like South Africa, comprising so many diverse and ill-assimilated races, cannot long subsist without some paramount authority. If that authority is abandoned by England, it will inevitably be assumed by some other Power. It seems to me less likely that the paramount Power to take our place will be African or Africander than European. There is at least one such Power, competent, and probably not unwilling, to undertake the task. Commercial Germany has long wished for a South African colony of its own; and, but for the wise self-restraint imposed by Prince Bismarck, would have possessed one ere now. But there are symptoms that this restraint is being relaxed. Experience only can show our Africander fellow-subjects what is the thickness of the little finger of German administration as compared with the thigh of the English Colonial Office; but one thing is certain, that at any port or on any frontier under the German flag our merchants and manufacturers may find a tariff, not necessarily hostile, but differential; and no one need tell them what difference even 5 per cent. in a Customs duty will make to those striving in the arduous race of mercantile competition. If we maintain our present position on the Bechuanaland border, there is at least one commercial road open into the interior. If we abandon that position, as defined by the Convention of 1881, that road may be any day closed by a foreign Customs line, and the market of the interior may be effectually cut off.

Such are briefly the reasons why it seems to me that the abrogation of the Pretoria Convention, as far as concerns the definition of the western boundary of the Transvaal, and the restrictions on Transvaal extension into Bechuanaland, can be good, neither for the people of the Transvaal, nor for the Bechuanas, nor for the Cape colonists, nor for the British people. On the other hand, I cannot find a single valid objection to the course proposed by the Rev. John Mackenzie, of extending an effectual British protectorate over Bechuanaland. Such a protectorate would meet the legitimate wants and wishes of the Bechuanas—a point which surely deserves some weight in deciding what is to be done—and would secure them against extinction, expulsion, or reduction to a condition of serfage. The Transvaal could offer no objection to Mr. Mackenzie's plan, save such as is founded on a kind of Munroe doctrine—that the English have no right to interfere north of the Vaal. Mr. Mackenzie's plan is simply a formal and efficient resumption of what was our principle and practice from the time we first came in contact with the Bechuanas and their Transvaal neighbours up to the date of the Convention

of 1881. It cannot be truly said that the plan would be difficult of execution, or would involve England in great or expensive responsibilities; for the fact is before us that the English protectorate—though never embodied in diplomatic forms—was efficient from 1840, especially through all the troubled years from 1877 to 1881, and that the Queen's authority was maintained, and when rebels from Griqualand West invaded Bechuanaland, peace and lawful order were restored by the Administrators, Colonels Lanyon and Warren, who had none but volunteer forces, raised from the territory north of the Orange River, ~~without~~ scarcely calling in a single British soldier. No one who has had practical experience of Bechuanaland doubts that taxation by hut-tax or otherwise would be readily borne by Bechuanas to pay for such protection, and would be as effectual, as in Natal, to meet all necessary expenses of administration.

In this, as in all other questions affecting the Transvaal, I would allow no thought of bitterness connected with the past to influence our action for the future. We have, whether for good or for evil, recognized the right of the Transvaal people to govern themselves, according to their own views, as long as they do not interfere with their neighbours. Let us frankly accept the new obligations we took on ourselves by the Convention of 1881, and let us abstain from all attempts to filch back the right of controlling the internal administration of the country which we then formally renounced. Let us go further, and honestly and cordially assist by every legitimate means the men in whose favour we then renounced the rights we previously claimed. Let us aid them to organize self-government on a permanent and prosperous footing, but do not let us attempt to conciliate them by allowing them to encroach on the rights of others. Do not let us now abrogate the restrictions which were imposed on such encroachments by the same instrument which surrendered our claims to regulate the internal government of the Transvaal.

NOTE ON BECHUANALAND.

(*November*, 1883.)

The Reverend J. Mackenzie now acting as Mankoarane's representative, in England, belongs to the London Missionary Society Missions in Bechuanaland, including the estates of many chiefs besides Mankoarane, who, being on the Transvaal frontier, has been the first to suffer from filibusters.

Paramount Chiefs in Bechuanaland are an invention or fiction of our own. The Bechuanas have always been divided into many tribes, large and small; each claiming independence.

The chiefs were and are like Highland chiefs of three centuries ago; many pretend to sovereign rights over their weaker neighbours, and if very rich, or able, or powerful, may exercise for a time some sort of sovereignty; but this was never recognised by any one strong enough to refuse recognition.

At this moment, if there were any one to listen to them, there are dozens of chiefs in Bechuanaland who would say they were quite independent of Mankoarane, that they acknowledged no one who had a right to command them save Queen Victoria—but that they quite agreed with Mankoarane in his remonstrances against filibusters, and prayed that the Queen would protect them.

In a country so divided, missionaries like Livingstone, Dr. Moffat, and Mr. Mackenzie (who is an excellent man of the same type as Livingstone) soon acquire, unconsciously, enormous power. Most of whatever intelligent energy may exist in the country soon gravitates to the teachers of the new doctrine—the chiefs themselves are more or less influenced—and if of naturally good dispositions, soon find that their own power is greatly increased by taking the Bible for their guide, and a good missionary as their habitual adviser and advocate. Such a chief is Kama, the powerful ruler of Bamangwato, far to the north of Mankoarane. He has hitherto successfully resisted filibusters, and has sixteen European families of missionaries and traders settled at his capital. But he used to write to me of his distrust of the Boers, and Mr. Mackenzie can speak for him as being quite as much interested in the Bechuanaland question as Mankoarane, though he has not yet suffered in a way to entitle him to ask for protection.

Kama's case is, however, exceptional. The great majority of

chiefs, in and near Bechuanaland, are weak sensualists; and after a generation of missionary teaching among their people, they find that real power has slipped from their hands—that the industrious law-abiding men, who follow the missionary's advice, are richer and more influential than themselves, and that they are powerless to resist European filibusters, unless they subsidize the same class of Europeans, who must be paid in cattle or farms, for fighting as mercenaries.

The missionary has the greater part of the chief's old power, and much more; but his calling prevents the missionary from exercising his power in political questions.

Any recognised agent of the English Government has, like the missionary, without seeking it, much ruling power forced on him by circumstances. Up to 1880 this power was often used by English officials in the interests of peace. Since 1880 this has been forbidden, and the result is the present anarchy.

In what I wrote in the 'Pall Mall,' I simply advocated our resuming the exercise of this power, which, whether we wish for it or not, is the inevitable result of our position in South Africa.

I believe that if this power were exercised as it used to be by myself and my predecessors, it would be ample and secure peace, and security for life and property in Bechuanaland.

The filibustering process is nothing new. Attempts to "jump" farms in Bechuanaland were made during our troubles in Zululand, and they were checked, without resort to armed force, simply by a few policemen meeting the filibusters, and telling them that filibustering would not be allowed.

This was effectual then, why should it not be so now?

Our abandonment of the Transvaal has, in one respect, weakened the policeman's power, but in other ways it has strengthened it; for, whereas in 1880 the present Transvaal rulers would gladly have supported the filibusters in worrying us or our subjects—they have now strong motives for, ostensibly at least, withholding support from any lawless proceedings.

I do not think the Transvaal Government is strong enough to prevent filibusters going from the Transvaal into Bechuanaland; but I do not think they have either the wish or the power to support them actively in wrong-doing.

The difficulty and cost of protecting the Bechuanas from aggression have been greatly exaggerated.

Why should they be more than in 1877 to 1880, when Colonels Lanyon and Warren kept the peace, after putting down actual rebellion, with no other force than police and

volunteers? They never called in a single English ~~soldier,~~ Regt. and what is wanted now is, not 10,000 or even 100 English soldiers, but two or three English officers, who will do what Lanyon and Warren did—organize and direct the local forces for self-defence, and be just and considerate to the Transvaal and to all men.

At first, no doubt, their proceedings might be unpopular in the Transvaal, and in the Orange Free State, and even among the Dutch at the Cape. But I am quite sure we may, in the long run, rely on the good sense and respect for law which actuates the majority of the Dutch population, and which will support us in doing what we can clearly show is a duty.

Even under the Sand River Convention the filibustering proceedings in Bechuanaland would have been illegal, and we should have been justified in opposing them. The Boers, if we are just and considerate to them in other matters, will soon recognise the justice of our protecting the Bechuanas.

As regards the possibility or probability of interference by other European nations, there can I think be no doubt, if England stands aloof. Before the Franco-German war there was much pressure put on the German Government by influential commercial bodies in Frankfort, Bremen, and Hamburgh, to acquire a German Colony in some temperate climate. A scientific expedition was sent out to South and Eastern Africa to report on it, with a view to colonization. Resident burghers of the Transvaal were in favour of the project, but the report of the scientific men sent out from Germany was not so favourable as to overcome the objections of Prince Bismarck. He approved of the idea on general grounds, but considered that Germany had then, as the objection was expressed to me, "too much hay on her fork" to make any large scheme of colonization prudent.

Latterly the commercial agitation in favour of a German colony has been revived, and permission has been given to hoist the German flag at Angra Pequina, a small port on the West Coast north of the Orange River, heretofore held to be British territory. Whatever we may think of it here, this step is regarded at the Cape as important and significant. There are Berlin missionaries in Eastern Bechuanaland who, four years ago, threatened Colonel Warren with the displeasure of the German Government if he did not respect their claim to independence of his control within the limits of their own mission. German traders will not be slow to follow the example thus set, if we withdraw from the paramount position we have hitherto held in those regions.

Why should we gratuitously open the door to such trouble

by abandoning the Bechuanas, who for fifty years have been considered as under our protection?

I do not think the plan for constituting Bechuanaland an "African Belgium" (i.e. an independent state, guaranteed by the surrounding powers—the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and the Cape Colony, as well as by the English Government) will work. It will only hamper us with impotent or unwilling colleagues, and prevent anything effectual being done to check lawless encroachment. It might content the Aborigines Protection Society, without offending the Extreme Radical Left, but it will not protect Bechuanaland against filibusters.

England can and ought to do the work by her own fiat, and to call in colleagues who cannot or will not work in aiding you, is thereby to court weakness and ensure failure.

(Signed) H. B. E. FRERE.

November 15*th*, 1883.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.